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ADEMPTION IN PENNSYLVANIA: NEAL ESTATE
The Orphans' Court of Warren County, Pennsylvania, has recently held
in Neal Estate' that the action of a guardian in exchanging shares of stock
in a corporation held by an incompetent for shares in a different corporation
did not effect an ademption of the specific legacy of the original stock. This
Note will inquire into the effect of this holding on the law of ademption in
Pennsylvania.
Ademption, in modern law, has two distinct meanings. The term is
sometimes used with reference to the act of the testator in paying to the
legatee, in the lifetime of the testator, a legacy which the testator has given
to the legatee by will, or in satisfying such legacy by giving in place thereof
something of value.2 The term used to describe such actions on the part of
the testator is ademption by satisfaction. Ademption is also used to indicate
the extinction of the legacy by the loss or destruction of the subject matter in
the lifetime of the testator, or by the loss, transfer or termination of the
testator's interest in the subject matter prior to his death. This extinction
of a legacy is denoted by the term ademption by extinction.3 The court in
Neal dealt with the latter use of the term "ademption."
It is a well-settled general rule that the principle of ademption by ex-
tinction applies only to specific legacies, 4 as distinguished from general lega-
cies.5 Also, the doctrine does not apply to demonstrative testamentary gifts,
i.e., gifts which are payable out of the estate generally, but which are charged
(as against other legatees or devisees of general gifts) on certain specific
1. 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 322 (Orphans' Ct. 1963).
2. In re Keeler, 225 Iowa 1349, 282 N.W. 362 (1938) ; Dillender v. Wilson, 228 Ky.
758, 16 S.W.2d 173 (1929) ; See Warren, The History of Ademption, 25 IOWA L. REV.
290 (1940).
3. Welch v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So. 197 (1927) ; "An Ademption of a legacy
is effected when by some act of the testator its subject matter has ceased to exist in the
form in which it is described in the will so that on his death there is nothing answering
the description to be given to the beneficiary." Ford v. Cottrell, 141 Tenn. 169, 176, 207
S.W. 734, 736 (1918), quoted in Wiggins v. Cheatham, 143 Tenn. 406, 410, 225 S.W.
1040, 1041 (1920).
4. "An ademption occurs when a legacy is specific and the thing bequeathed is dis-
posed of by testator in his lifetime. There is no ademption, however, where the legacy
is general .... " McFerren Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 492, 76 A.2d 759, 761 (1950).
5. Since a general legacy is to be paid out of the testator's estate generally, the
destruction, sale or transfer of specific things cannot prevent the satisfaction of the general
gift as long as enough remains in the estate, after payment of debts and the like, to
satisfy the legacy in order of its priority. Thus, for example, a beneficiary under a general
legacy of securities will not lose the cash value of his legacy merely because the testator
did not own such securities at his death, and the executor is unable to purchase similar
securities at the date of testator's death. In such cases, the difficulty in determining the
value of the gift or non-existence of the subject matter does not, in itself, cause an
ademption. Hollenbaugh's Estate, 402 Pa. 256, 167 A.2d 270 (1961) ; McFerren Estate,
365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759 (1950).
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property.6 As applied to a specific gift or legacy, the effect of the doctrine
of ademption is to destroy such a gift or legacy when there has been a sale,
destruction and the like of the specific thing which has been specifically be-
queathed, 7 unless, either by the provisions of the will or by some special statute,
8
the proceeds of the gift are given to the legatee in place of the property itself.
In Neal Estate testatrix owned one hundred and thirty six (136) shares
of stock in the Floridin Company. Testatrix became incompetent and a guar-
dian was appointed who, with court approval, entered into an agreement
exchanging the Floridin stock for stock in the Pennsylvania Glass Sand
Corporation. The agreement made by the guardian was a part of a general
agreement whereby all Floridin Company stock was to be acquired by the
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corporation. After finding that testatrix had made
a specific bequest of the Floridin stock by a will executed four years prior
to the stock exchange the court was faced with the question of whether the
exchange of the stock by the guardian effected an ademption of this specific
bequest. In refusing to find that there had been an ademption, the court laid
great stress on the possible favoritism toward one legatee over another which
could be exercised by the guardian if his actions were to be deemed to effect
an ademption.0
At early common-law, an ademption by extinction of the subject matter
of the specific gift or legacy was based on the intention of the testator.'
0
The rationale of this rule was that the facts which worked such extinction
indicated that the testator had changed his mind and did not intend to be-
queath the property to the legatee." Strict adherence to the rule that the
6. The sale, destruction and the like of the property upon which it is charged
terminates the charge and causes the legacy to cease to be a demonstrative legacy. As
far as it is a legacy which is payable out of testator's estate generally such sale, destruc-
tion and the like does not affect the legacy. To the extent that the legacy can be paid
from the general funds of the estate, in order of its priority, such legacy is not affected
by the sale or destruction of the property. If the legacy is not paid it is because the
testator's estate is not large enough to pay it. This is a question of abatement, not of
ademption. Shearer's Estate, 346 Pa. 97, 29 A.2d 535 (1943) ; Pennsylvania Co. v. Riley,
89 N.J. Eq. 252, 104 Atl. 225 (1918) ; Smith Appeal, 103 Pa. 559 (1883).
7. Horn's Estate, 317 Pa. 49, 175 Atl. 414 (1934) ; Harshaw v. Harshaw, 184 Pa.
401, 39 AtI. 89 (1898).
8. The legislatures, in a few states, have changed the common law of ademption by
statute in effect providing that the devisee or legatee to whom the adeemed legacy or
devise was given may follow the proceeds of such legacy or devise unless it appears from
the will, or in some other way, that testator did not intend that such heir should receive
the proceeds. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 187 Ky. 324, 218 S.W. 1001 (1920) ; Haselwood
v. Webster, 82 Ky. 409 (1884). Such a statute is usually interpreted as applying only
to gifts to those persons who are heirs. Newby v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 195 Ky.
481, 243 S.W. 11 (1922) ; Dillender v. Wilson, 228 Ky. 758, 16 S.W.2d 173 (1929).
9. 32 D. & C.2d at 338.
10. Coke v. Bullock, Cro. Jac. 49, 79 Eng. Rep. 41 (K.B. 1791) ; In re Partridge,




testator's intention determines the existence or non-existence of an ademption
creates a problem in cases where it is difficult or impossible to ascertain the
testator's intention.
If extinguishment of the subject matter of the specific bequest operates
as an ademption or not, depending on the testator's intention, and if such
intention may be shown by testator's oral declarations, then the controlling
evidence in the case will consist of the written will, executed in accordance
with the statute, together with testator's oral declarations. 12 This violates
both the letter and the spirit of wills acts, which insist on the formalities of a
writing and execution in order to avoid opportunities for perjury.'8 For this
reason, it is now the majority rule in the United States that the sale, de-
struction or collection of the bequest or devise adeems such bequest or devise
without regard to the actual intention of the testator.14 Ademption, under
the majority rule, depends rather on a rule of law, arising from the extinction
of the property or fund granted. This modern rule is justified in part, be-
cause of the confusion which would arise in attempting to determine the
intention of the testator; and in part, because upon the sale, collection, and
the like of the subject of the bequest or devise, there is nothing in existence
which conforms to the gift in the will.
15
In no state has the modern rule disregarding the testator's intent been
more rigorously applied than in Pennsylvania. As early as 1834 in Blackstone
v. Blackstone, 6 Chief Justice Gibson said "that the annihilation of a specific
legacy or such change in its state as to make it another thing, annuls the
bequest for reasons paramount to consideration of intention, is now too firmly
12. See White v. Winchester, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 48 (1827) ; Thomond v. Suffolk,
1 P. Wms. 461, 24 Eng. Rep. 474 (Ch. 1718).
13. I PAGE, WILLS § 236 (3d ed. 1941).
14. In re Keeler, 225 Iowa 1349, 282 N.W. 362 (1938) ; Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa.
301 (1853). See also Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox 184, 30 Eng. Rep. 85 (Ch. 1789),
wherein it was said:
The only rule to be adhered to was to see whether the subject of the specific
bequest remained in specie at the time of the testator's death; for if it did not,
then, there must be an end of the bequest; and that the idea of discussing what
were the particular motives and intention of the testator in each case in destroy-
ing the subject of the bequest, would be productive of endless uncertainty and
confusion.
Id. at 186, 30 Eng. Rep. 86.
15. Hoke v. Herman, supra note 14, at 305, wherein the court said:
[I]f a thing bequeathed in a will by such description so as to distinguish it
from all other things be disposed of, so that it does not remain at the death of the
testator, or if it be changed that it cannot be called the same thing, the bequest
is gone. If such a legacy be a debt, payment necessarily makes an end of it.
The legatee is entitled to the very thing bequeathed if it be possible for the
executor to give it to him; but if not, he can not have money in place of it. This
results from an inflexible rule of law applied to the mere fact that the thing
bequeathed does not exist, and it is not founded on any presumed intention of the
testator.
16. 3 Watts 335 (Pa. 1834).
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settled to be questioned.' 1 7 Blackstone teaches that the courts will not specu-
late concerning the intention of the testator with respect to his testamentary
scheme when the subject matter of a specific legacy or devise is sold or dis-
posed of by him prior to his death.1
8
While in the normal case involving a sale, transfer or destruction of the
subject matter by the testator himself, there is little problem in applying the
"immateriality of intention" doctrine of ademption, a great deal of confusion
and controversy has arisen in the so-called "guardian sale" cases. In the
"guardian sale" cases the subject matter of the specific bequest or devise is
not in existence at the testator's death because it has been disposed of in his
lifetime by a guardian or committee appointed for his estate when he has
become incompetent.
In this type of case there is a direct conflict among the authorities on
the question of whether the legatee can pursue the proceeds. 19 Neal attempts
to resolve the question in Pennsylvania.
The decisions in the guardian sale case may be classified into two distinct
categories: (1) a sale by a guardian or committee fully adeems the legacy
or devise,20 and (2) the sale by the guardian or committee adeems only pro
tanto, i.e., only to the extent that the proceeds of the sale are consumed for
the testator's benefit before his death. 2'
Before entering into a discussion of the Neal holding, it is necessary to
examine the cases in Pennsylvania prior to Neal. It is submitted that this
examination will show that the Pennsylvania courts have been dissatisfied
with the application of the immateriality of intention doctrine of ademption
to guardian sale cases. The court in Neal noted this dissatisfaction of the
Pennsylvania courts in the following manner:
The decisions have been hard to reconcile but the rigors of the
17. Id. at 338.
18. See Derby Estate, 14 Fiduc. Rep. 66 (Philadelphia County Orphans' Ct., 1963),
wherein the court stated:
Since the decision in Blackstone v. Blackstone . . . it has been the law of this
Commonwealth, without equivocation, that an asset once owned by testator, and
specifically bequeathed in his will, but not in existence at the time of his death,
is adeemed, irrespective of his intention.
Id. at 68.
19. Compare Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896, cert. denied, 217 U.S.
606 (7th Cir. 1910), in which testator's intention was considered necessary to effect an
ademption so that a guardian's dealings with testator's property will not cause an ademp-
tion, with In re Ireland, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405, reversing 231 App. Div. 228, 247
N.Y. Supp. 267 (1930) wherein the "identity" or "in specie" test controls without regard
to testator's intention so that a guardian is capable of adeeming a specific legacy from
the incompetent testator.
20. Graf's Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 20 (Orphans' Ct. 1946); Woodward's Estate,
3 Pa. D. & C. 433 (Orphans' Ct. 1922) ; Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. 301 (1853).




ademption rule have been avoided and equitable results obtained by
a liberal interpretation of testator's intent in defining what is the
subject matter of the gift. If the subject matter is the proceeds of
designated property and not the property itself, the legacy is not
specific and the gift is not adeemed .... 22
From the "guardian sale" cases a different rule of ademption has evolved
to be applied when the sale, destruction and the like of the subject matter
of a specific legacy is the result of the action of a guardian. The basic source
of this rule is Lloyd v. Hart23 In Lloyd the incompetent left no will. A lunacy
committee appointed to administer his estate sold real estate with court ap-
proval; the proceeds of the sale to be used for the maintenance of the incom-
petent. Upon the incompetent's death over one-half of the proceeds from such
sale remained unexpended. The court held that the sale of the real estate
by the committee did not work an ademption of the surplus but only an
ademption pro tanto, i.e., only to the extent of the amount actually expended
for the maintenance of the incompetent. Furthermore, the court held that
the Act of 1836,24 through which the committee derived its sole authority to
sell the real estate, did not give the committee
... power to convert beyond the exigencies of the occasion.., since,
had it not been for those exigencies, the legislature would have con-
ferred no power at all. The power was to be exercised, not for the
sake of conversion merely but for a purpose beyond it, and beyond
the accomplishment of such a purpose, it is not to be supported .... 25
The next case dealing with this problem, Hoke v. Herman,20 arose seven
years after Lloyd. Taking the position that an ademption does not depend on
the intention of the testator, the court in Hoke ruled that a specific bequest
of a promissory note to the maker of the note was adeemed to the extent of
the amount paid thereon by the maker to the guardian of the testator after the
latter had become insane. The court reached this conclusion even though the
legatee and the guardian did not know of the existence of the bequest at
the time the payment was made and indorsed on the note. Consequently, the
specific legatee, having received from the executor the note bequeathed to him,
could not recover from the executor the amount which he had paid to the
guardian for application on such note, because the specific bequest was adeemed
pro tanto by such payment.
The conclusion of Hoke that intention plays no role in ademption was
followed in Woodward Estate.27 There testator's will made a specific devise
22. 32 Pa. D. & C.2d at 333.
23. 2 Pa. 473 (1846).
24. Pa. Laws 1836, at 589, repealed, Pa. Laws 1951, at 612.
25. 2 Pa. at 478.
26. 21 Pa. 301 (1853).
27. Woodward's Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C. 433 (Orphans' Ct. 1922).
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of his farm to his son. Thereafter, the testator became incompetent, and his
estate was placed in the hands of a guardian who sold the farm, pursuant to
a court order. The balance in the guardian's hands at testator's death was
turned over to testator's executors; the court holding that by the sale of the
farm by the guardian the specific devise was adeemed and thus, the specific
devisee had no right to the fund representing the proceeds of the farm.
Presented with the conflict of whether the actions of the guardian fully
adeem the specific legacy or adeem it only to the extent that the funds are
expended for the maintenance of the incompetent, a lower court in Irwin
Estate2 8 attempted a reconciliation. In Irwin, the decedent executed a will
in 1950, devising her real estate to her son. In 1956, the decedent's guardian
executed an agreement to sell the real estate, pursuant to a court order. Before
the sale was completed the decedent died. Thereafter, her executor com-
pleted the sale and held the proceeds. While the sale was intended and ap-
proved by the court to create a fund for the decedent's maintenance, her
death precluded any necessity for expending the proceeds for such purpose.
The court adopted the rationale of Lloyd in holding that the sale did not
operate as an ademption beyond the amount needed for the incompetent's
support (in this case none of the funds were so expended).
Thus, while the above case law in Pennsylvania exhibits divergent
views on major aspects of the problem, as does the case law in the majority
of the jurisdictions of the United States, it is plain that generally speaking,
the guardian of an incompetent testator is not wholly without power to ac-
complish an ademption of a specific devise. For example, where the guardian
has acted within his lawful authority (and particularly, where he has been
authorized to do so by court order) and has sold property belonging to the
ward for the latter's maintenance, the devise or legacy from the ward is
adeemed at least pro tanto, i.e., to the extent that the proceeds have been ap-
plied and consumed for the benefit of the ward.
29
The more serious problem, however, arises when the sale by the guardian
is not necessary for the incompetent's maintenance. Perhaps the sale is
necessary to preserve the value of the estate, such as when property held
appears to be losing its value.
Is the act of the guardian in this type of situation to be an ademption?
The courts are in conflict on this question. The reason for the conflict is the
different views taken as to the effect of the testator's intention. Is the in-
competent testator's intention to be considered in resolving the ademption
28. 23 Pa. D. & C.2d 37 (Orphans' Ct. 1960).
29. See Lewis v. Hill, 387 Ill. 542, 56 N.E.2d 619 (1944) ; Kamkin v. Kaiser, 256
S.W. 558 (Mo. App. 1923) ; Morse v. Converse, 80 N.H. 24, 113 Atl. 214 (1921) (in
which testator was not mentally incompetent).
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issue, or is intention immaterial and is the issue to be decided on whether the
legacy in specie remains in the estate at the time of death?
Neal attempts to answer the above question by adjusting the heretofore
rigid rules of ademption to the equities of the particular case. The conversion
of the subject matter by the guardian in Neal was in no way necessary for
the maintenance of the incompetent. The conversion was part of a program
of one corporation to absorb the assets of another. To the court in Neal the
"in specie" doctrine of ademption, i.e., the subject matter of the gift has to be
in existence at testator's death or the gift is adeemed, ignores the equities in-
volved: "Justice is blind in that it is never swayed by rank or power, but
justice is never blind to the facts."3 The court recognizes that there is a dis-
tinction to be drawn where the testator is competent and where he becomes
incompetent. In the former case the testator after the sale or destruction of the
subject of the legacy is able to execute or revise his will to provide for the
loss of the subject matter, but in the latter the testator's incompetency pre-
vents him from so doing, and thus, the strict rule of ademption destroys his
testamentary scheme. Thus, the Neal rule provides a degree of protection
to the testator who is incapable of adjusting his gifts to provide for those
persons previously the recipients of his bounty.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Neal decision is its recognition
of the favoritism which a guardian would be able to exercise among the
named legatees of the incompetent. This recognition is verbalized in the
following manner in a passage drawn from a respected authority 3' on the
subject of wills:
The results of the rule that sale, collection, and the like by the
guardian of an incompetent person operates as an ademption have
been very unsatisfactory. A guardian who is hostile to one of the
beneficiaries may adeem the gift to him by a sale of the property or
by collection of a debt. If he is friendly to one to whom a general
gift is made or to whom a general residuary gift is given, he may
increase the amount of such gift by converting the property into
the form which is given to such beneficiary.
2
Lloyd and Irwin refused to follow the immateriality of intention doctrine
in guardian sale cases. These decisions refused to find an ademption beyond
the amount expended for the incompetent's maintenance. Neal extends
their rationale to a case where the conversion of the subject matter of the
legacy was in no way connected with the maintenance of the incompetent.
The three cases taken together demonstrate that at the least a different
standard of ademption is necessary in the guardian sale cases.
30. 32 Pa. D. & C.2d at 340.
31. IV PAGE, op. cit. supra note 13, § 530.
32. 32 Pa. D. & C.2d at 338.
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Furthermore, Neal seems to throw new light on the entire doctrine of
ademption, suggesting that an examination of the rules should be undertaken.
The rigidity and severity of the ademption rules are clearly shown in the
recent case of Smith Estate." It is a nonguardian sale case but worthy of note
because it shows the inequities which can arise from the present ademption
doctrine. In Smith testatrix bequeathed all her stock in a specific corporation
to the trustees of an inter vivos trust created by her son. At the age of 90,
testatrix was advised by her attorney to accept an offer to purchase the
above-mentioned stock. Her attorney testified that at this time testatrix was,
in his opinion, incompetent to make a will. Nevertheless, the court found
that she possessed testamentary capacity and agreed with the auditing judge
that an ademption had occured, i.e., that decedent's sale of the stock was a
voluntary act made at a time when she understood the nature of the trans-
action. No one advised her of the possibility of there being an ademption at
the time she sold the stock. There was also testimony that she (decedent)
could not remember the names of her close relatives, and that she did not
know the exact number of the shares of stock that she owned. Furthermore,
her attorney was of the opinion that she was incompetent to execute a codicil
to her will.
Smith is just one case in a line of cases which shows most acutely the in-
equities of the application of the strict rule of ademption.84 It has been sug-
gested that the time has come for legislative action to secure relief from the
severity of this rule.85 However, it is submitted, that decisions such as Neal
show very clearly that our courts are able to recognize the equities involved in
these ademption cases, and can adjust the rules accordingly. The courts have
fashioned the rules of ademption and they are capable of supplying relief
from their rigidity without the assistance of any legislative body.
MORGAN R. JONES
33. 415 Pa. 569, 202 A.2d 40 (1964).
34. See Dublin Estate, 2 Fiduc. Rep. 309 (Allegheny County Orphans' Ct. 1952),
wherein the intention of the testator was given primary consideration to avoid the severity
of rule of ademption. See also Frost Estate, 354 Pa. 223, 47 A.2d, 219 (1946) ; Wood-
ward's Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C. 433 (Orphans' Ct. 1922).
35. See FIDuc. REv. 1-2 (Sept. 1964) ; Note, 74 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1961).
